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Keiretsu: Their Effect on Business and 
How American Government and Business 
Can Confront Them 
While recent reports indicate an increasing tolerance of 
foreign companies doing business in Japan,' substantial obsta- 
cles still exist.' One of the most difficult aspects of doing busi- 
ness in Japan is competing with the well-established system of 
keiretsu3 which permeates the Japanese business world. Sim- 
ply defined, keiretsu are networks or families of corporations 
that have interlocking interests in one another.' Keiretsu pri- 
marily affect foreign and local companies competing in the 
Japanese market, but they also have a secondary effect on U.S. 
companies competing with keiretsu-affiliated Japanese compa- 
nies operating in the United States. For many "foreigners try- 
ing to do business in Japan, [keiretsu] have become the symbol, 
and source, of the country's most exclusionary practices.'" 
This comment examines the effects of keiretsu on business 
in Japan and America. It also explores approaches American 
government and business can take to confront keiretsu. Section 
I1 of this comment begins with a brief overview, summarizing 
the origins of keiretsu and defining its different types. Section 
1. According to a report given to the American Chamber of Commerce in Ja-  
pan (ACCJ), "[tlhe environment for U.S. trade and investment in Japan has signifi- 
cantly improved in the last five to 10 years." Green Light Seen for Trade, JAPAN 
TIMES, June 12, 1991, available in Nikkei Database. Also, "[iln an extensive study 
done in early 1991 by the ACCJ and the global management consulting firm A.T. 
Kearney International Inc., . . . some 55 percent of respondents said the climate 
for investment had improved over the last five years." Trade, Investment Clinate 
Has Improved, Survey Finds, INTI BUS. DAILY (BNA), Aug. 29, 1991, available in 
LEXIS, Nexis Library, BNAITD File [hereinafter Survey]. 
2. "Among the main obstacles listed were the high cost of doing business in 
Japan, the dificulty in finding qualified personnel, the multi-tiered distribution 
system, the interlocking business and ownership relationships known as keiretsu, 
and government ministry guidelines, policies, and regulations." Survey, supra note 
1 (italics added). 
3. Keiretsu is both singular and plural, and is pronounced kfi're-tsoo. 
4. Interlocking Ties Among Companies Criticized, NIKKEI WKLY., July 27, 1991, 
a t  8. 
5. Inside the Charmed Circle, ECONOMIST, Jan. 5, 1991, at 54, 54. 
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I11 examines the benefits and costs of keiretsu. Section IV ana- 
lyzes various strategies American government and business can 
employ to deal with keiretsu. Section V concludes that imitation 
of the keiretsu system, coupled with reforms in federal corpo- 
rate law, may be the best choice for the United States. 
A. Origins of Keiretsu 
After World War 11, keiretsu grew out of the dismantled 
z a i b a t ~ u , ~  which were huge banking families that, during the 
nineteenth century, were "closed, monolithic superstructures 
tightly held together by a single holding company."7 The 
zaibatsu built themselves into huge industrial combines, con- 
trolling everything from mining to manufacturing. The zaibatsu 
were a concentrated source of power in Japan and "became the 
driving force of Japanese militarism" in the 1930s.' 
Because the Allied Powers saw the enormous power of the 
zaibatsu as "a hinderance to democracy,"g General MacArthur 
and the occupation forces attempted to dismantle them.'' 
However, in the early 19509, after the American occupation 
forces left Japan and tacitly allowed the Japanese government 
to relax restrictions, many of the zaibatsu companies began to 
renew their former alliances, albeit this time in a more loosely 
affiliated and diversified form." In fact, "[tlhree of the big six 
horizontal keiretsu were formed in the 1950s out of the pieces 
of the . . . zaibatsu."12 
One of the reasons these companies regrouped was the 
Tokyo capital market's inability to raise capital in the early 
postwar years. According to Kermit Schoenholtz, a senior econ- 
6. I t  has even been suggested that keiretsu "have roots in the ancient relation- 
ship between feudal landlords . . . and their samurai." Michael Kinsley, 
Keiretsuphobia, NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1991, at 4, 4. 
7. DANIEL I. OKIMOTO, BETWEEN MITI AND THE MARKET: JAPANESE INDUSTRI- 
AL POLICY FOR HIGH TECHNOLOGY 133 (1989). 
8. Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, at  54. 
9. MacNeil l kh re r  Newshour: Focus-Keiretsu (WNET television broadcast, 
Sept. 19, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, MACLEH File [hereinafter 
MacNeil l k h r e r  Newshour]. 
10. Kinsley, supra note 6, at 4. 
11. Insick the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, a t  54. 
12. Carla Rapoport, Why Japan Keeps on Winning, FORTUNE, July 15, 1991, at  
76, 77 (italics added). The other three have formed around major banks-Fuyo, 
DKB, and Sanwa. Many members of these keiretsu also have roots in the nine- 
teenth century. Id. 
11551 CONFRONTING KEIRETSU 1157 
omist a t  the Tokyo branch of Salomon Brothers, "companies 
that wanted to expand" had to join groups to raise capital.13 
By gathering around a bank, keiretsu companies were able to 
obtain investment capital a t  a lower rate in exchange for enter- 
ing into the group relationship. With the expansion of the capi- 
tal market in Japan, keiretsu have lost much of their initial 
appeal, "[blut Schoenholtz does not believe that [they] will 
disappear overnight just because the financial conditions have 
~hanged."'~ Indeed, as explained below, companies affiliated 
with a keiretsu are under intense pressure to remain loyal. 
One of the obstacles the former zaibatsu companies had to 
overcome when regrouping into their current keiretsu was the 
prohibition against companies buying their own shares. To 
avoid this problem, companies engaged in "a form of corporate 
blood brotherhood called cross-~hareholding."'~ Under this sys- 
tem, member companies own shares in other member compa- 
nies. Currently, "[als much as  25% of some companies is held 
by other members of a keiretsu ."I6 This interdependent owner- 
ship alliance, while within the laws established by the occupa- 
tion forces, serves much the same function as the former 
zaibatsu. The keiretsu companies are tied together through 
their cross-holdings, and "[slhareholders expect business, not 
dividends, to flow from their investment."17 
B. Types of Keiretsu 
Precisely defining keiretsu1' is difficult because the term 
encompasses a number of different types of corporate alliances. 
However, "keiretsu are characterized by the presence of a domi- 
nant firm which organizes and partially finances the other 
associated companies, 'extensive intra-keiretsu stockholding,' 
and frequent purchases of intermediate goods from other 
13. Charles Smith, Reform Runs into Resistance, FAR E. ECON. REV., June 21, 
1990, at  50, 54. 
14. Id. 
15. Rapoport, supra note 12, at 85. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. The first of the two Chinese characters used to represent the word kiretsu 
means system, lineage, faction, group, zone, corollary, connection. The second char- 
acter means row, rank, tier, file, column, line, procession, queue. Together, they 
mean order, succession. ANDREW N. NELSON, THE MODERN READER'S JAPANESE- 
ENGLISH CHARACTER DICTIONARY 89, 521 (2d rev. ed. 1974). However, when used 
in a business setting, the word keiretsu does not have an English equivalent, so 
the Japanese word has been imported. 
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keiretsu members."lg Many of the current keiretsu are "based 
on either prewar [industrial] conglomerates (zaibatsu), financial 
ties . . . or vertical in tegra t i~n ."~~ These keiretsu groups are 
not closed or tightly held. Rather, they are "a loosely knit, per- 
meable set of industrial networks, connected through cross-cut- 
ting linkages?' 
Keiretsu are divided into two types: horizontal and verti- 
cal.22 Horizontal keiretsu are usually organized around a bank 
and consist of a variety of companies that perform different 
functions. Mitsubishi is an example of a horizontal keiretsu.23 
"Corporate membership in a [horizontal] keiretsu . . . usually 
involves heavy reliance on the main keiretsu bank for debt 
financing, and extensive intra-keiretsu stock holding^."^^ Verti- 
cal keiretsu, on the other hand, are "composed of a major indus- 
trial corporation and its suppliers in a particular industry.7725 
These vertical keiretsu are "held together by fairly predictable 
transaction patterns and based on implicit long-term contracts, 
financing, and equity ownership."26 The Toyota keiretsu is an  
example of a vertical keiretsu, dominating its family of parts 
manufacturers and suppliers. 27 
19. Steven R. Englund, Book Note, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1232, 1234 (1988) (re- 
viewing JAPAN'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS OF IN- 
D U ~ I A L  POLICY (Hugh Patrick ed., 1986)) (footnotes omitted). 
20. OKIMOTQ, supra note 7, at  132-33. 
21. Id. at  133. 
22. In both types of keiretsu, member companies own some of the others' stock 
and "Itlop executives of the group's main bank or trading company have seats on 
other members' boards." Rapoport, supra note 12, at  77. Many Americans would 
call this collusion, but to the Japanese, this system of business alliances and long- 
term relationships is the keiretsu system that marks Japan's special brand of capi- 
talism and is the reason Japan has come to dominate international markets. Id. a t  
76. Keninchi Imai, an industrial-policy expert a t  Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo, 
provides a more detailed breakdown of these two main classes of keiretsu in Insidt! 
the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, at 54. 
23. The Mitsubishi keiretsu has member companies in such diverse fields as 
financial services, computers and electronics, automobiles, food and beverages, con- 
struction, metals, real estate, oil and coal, rubber and glass, chemicals, fibers and 
textiles, pulp and paper, industrial equipment, cameras and optics, and shipping 
and transportation. See Rapport, supra note 12, a t  81. 
24. Daniel I. Okimoto, Regime Characteristics of Japanese Industrial Policy, in 
JAPAN'S HIGH TJXHNOLOGY INDUSTRIES: LESSONS AND LIM~ATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL 
PoLICN 35, 47 (Hugh Patrick ed., 1986). 
25. Kinsley, supm note 6, at 4. 
26. Okimoto, supra note 24, at 46. 
27. Toyota owns 1Wo of Koito Manufacturing, its headlight provider; 41.4% of 
Toyoda Gosay, its rubber manufacturer; 14% of Fubata International, a muMer 
manufacturer; and so on through its entire group of suppliers. Each of these com- 
panies also owns shares in Toyota. See MacNeillLehrer Newshour, supra note 9. 
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111. BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE ~ ~ % ~ Z E T S U  SYSTEM 
A. Benefits 
While the United States continues to urge Japan to change 
the keiretsu system:8 the Japanese refuse to be apologetic 
about keiretsu and view them as a superior form of business 
structure worthy of ern~lation.'~ Indeed, many advantages 
exist in the keiretsu system. 
One of the most often cited advantages of the keiretsu 
system is that it allows member companies to plan on a long- 
term basis, rather than having to focus on short-term profits. 
This advantage is well illustrated by the relationship between 
Sumitomo Bank and Nippon Electric Corporation (NEC), both 
member companies in the Sumitomo keiretsu. 
When NEC needs to raise investment capital, it will rely 
on direct external financing from Sumitomo Bank, which owns 
shares in NEC. Unlike individual stockholders, Sumitomo 
Bank, as a corporate stockholder, is "willing to accept low rates 
of return on investment (ROI) as long as the real value (as 
distinct from par value) of equity shares  appreciate^.'"^ Conse- 
quently, because U.S. companies tend to rely on internal fi- 
nancing to raise capital, NEC is under less pressure than most 
U.S. companies to adopt strategies yielding high short-term 
profits. This decreased pressure results fkom Sumitomo Bank's 
policy of putting less pressure on NEC to pay out large divi- 
dends if such dividends might lead to NEC's default on the 
loan. This cross-holding of stock "by corporations willing to 
accept low ROI give[s] Japanese companies some degree of 
insulation from imperatives of equity  market^,"^' allowing 
them to plow back a higher portion of retained earnings into 
research and development, marketing, and other investments 
that provide continuous growth.32 
In  addition, when the economy is sluggish, "Sumitomo 
28. See Loosen Khiretsu Structures: US Urges Japan at SZZ Talks, MAINICHI 
DAILY NEWS, May 23, 1991, available in Nikkei Database [hereinafter Loosen 
Structures]; Reform Keiretsu. Mosbacher Urges, NIKKEI WKLY., July 20, 1991, at 3. 
29. Anthony Rowley, Defending Japan Inc., FAR E. ECON. REV., Dec. 27, 1990, 
at 44, 44. 
30. OKIMOTO, supra note 7 ,  at 137. 
31. Id. 
32. Okimoto, supra note 24, at 48; Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 5,  at 
54. 
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Bank is often willing to refinance old loans or extend new 
ones."33 This affords NEC the luxury of continuing growth 
strategies even during difEcult economic times. As rebuffed 
corporate raider T. Boone Pickens wrote, this aspect of the 
keiretsu system "reinforces Japan's stable business environ- 
ment, providing corporate managers with the time and capital 
to plan for the long term."34 
Of course, Sumitomo Bank also benefits from this practice. 
I t  requires NEC to fully disclose "information concerning com- 
pany operations, cooperate when business is good, and, if nec- 
essary, accept some infringement of autonomy in allowing the 
bank the right to send its own people into key management 
 position^."^^ NEC, however, regards this as a small price to 
pay for the luxury of a continual source of financing. 
An advantage of the keiretsu system that was much publi- 
cized during T. Boone Pickens's futile attempt to gain a seat on 
Koito'sS6 board of directors is that keiretsu member companies 
are much less vulnerable to hostile takeovers and leveraged 
buyouts.37 Two factors provide this protection. First, if a 
keiretsu fears that one of its member companies may be taken 
over, i t  can deliberately shieldS8 itself by raising "mutual 
shareholding[s] to fight off potential takeover attempts."3g Sec- 
ond, keiretsu member companies, the big shareholders, never 
sell their interests because their investments are "for business 
reasons and capital gains."40 
Another benefit of the keiretsu system is that it "encourag- 
e [ ~ ]  the exchange of information and technology.'"' This is 
because keiretsu provide "a ready-made network for informa- 
tion gathering, sharing, and policy deliberations" which "cut[s] 
across industrial se~tors.'"~ Although foreign businesses often 
33. OKIMOTO, supra note 7, at  137. 
34. Kinsley, supm note 6, at 4. 
35. OKIMOTO, supra note 7, at 137. 
36. Koito is a supplier in the Toyota keiretsu. See supra note 27. 
37. I t  is noteworthy that after Pickens sold his shares of Koito stock, Tetsuya 
Tsukatani, the former chairman of components maker Ichikoh, renewed his effort 
to smash the keiretsu system. Ichikoh is a supplier company in the Nissan keiretsu, 
and Tsukatani claims he was fired from his own company by a board of directors 
controlled by Nissan. See Anthony Rowley, Whistle Blower, FAR E. ECON. REV., 
May 23, 1991, at 65. 
38. See Okimoto, supra note 24, at 48. 
39. Smith, supra note 13, at 54. 
40. Rapoport, supra note 12, at 77. 
41. Rowley, supra note 29, at  44. 
42. Okimoto, supra note 24, at 47. 
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complain that this sharing is a form of unfair collusion, the 
Japanese government has yet to address these complaints. 
The keiretsu system also provides the Japanese govern- 
ment easy "access points" for government intervention, though 
such action is rarely needed.43 The leaders of the keiretsu com- 
panies often work closely with the Ministry of International 
Trade and Industry (MITI) and other government ministries." 
A comparison of the Chrysler and Mazda bailouts illustrates 
this point. The Chrysler bailout required heavy U.S. govern- 
ment intercession, but the Mazda bailout was "handled by the 
Sumitomo . . . group, especially Sumitomo Bank, and [Mazda's] 
subcontractors and  distributor^."^^ 
Finally, the keiretsu system assures the member companies 
both a constant supply source and a constant market. The 
remarks of a Japanese auto executive in America illustrate this 
supply source preference system: "First choice is a keiretsu 
company, second is a Japanese supplier, [and] third is a local 
[U.S.] company."46 This policy means suppliers can always sell 
their goods to the manufacturers and manufacturers have a 
continual supply source. However, this attitude is also the 
main reason the United States government and businesses are 
calling for the dismantling of the keiretsu system. 
B. Costs 
Despite the benefits, keiretsu also have several disadvan- 
tages. Companies within the keiretsu face the costs of 'lower 
profit margins for member firms, the dangers of oligopolistic 
collusion, and wasteful d~pl icat ion."~~ More severe are the 
costs to the Japanese consumer who pays more for both domes- 
tic and imported goods. Still another cost is the trade friction 
created by the keiretsu's exclusionary practices, often within 
the keiretsu's distribution system. 
Keiretsu involve many costs for the member companies. 
Keiretsu are organized to spread the costs of business among 
the member companies. Their profit margins can be lower than 
43. OKIMOTO, supra note 7, at 149-52. 
44. Rapoport, supra note 12, at 84. "Even if MITI wanted to be confrontational, 
it would be hard to confront an industry chock-full of ex-MITI officials. The system 
of amakuduri, literally 'descent from heaven,' sends scores of MITI officers, retired 
at a vigorous 55, to Japanese industry each year." Id. 
45. OKIMOTO, supra note 7, at 139. 
46. Rapoport, supra note 12, at 80 (italics added). 
47. Okimoto, supra note 24, at 47. 
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they otherwise would be for a highly profitable company within 
the keiretsu because they must devote capital to other less prof- 
itable member companies. 
Another problem, according to T. Boone Pickens, is that 
supplier companies often "become captives" of the keiretsu." 
For example, when the main company in the keiretsu decides to 
cut costs, it often forces its supplier companies to sell their 
goods at a lower profit, and sometimes at a loss. Because these 
supplier companies rely so heavily on the main company for 
orders, they have no choice but to comply. 
As noted, opportunities for collusion are built into the 
system. This means that problems such as price fixing are 
common.49 This drawback is compounded by Japan's soft, and 
loosely enforced, antitrust laws." 
Keiretsu also pose a problem of misallocation of resources. 
This happens when a member company has excess plant capac- 
ity as  a result of each keiretsu's desire to have a member com- 
pany represented in all major industries. This leads to "pres- 
sures to overproduce during recessions and to export surplus 
production in order to climb out of re~essions."~' 
Keiretsu often cause increased costs to consumers. Imports 
cost more because keiretsu deny foreign firms access to their 
national distribution system. Accordingly, foreign producers 
have daculty selling their goods in Japan. The American 
automobile industry is an  excellent example of this problem. 
American car manufacturers who wish to sell cars in Japan 
encounter difficulty in finding a dealership willing to sell Amer- 
ican cars.52 According to Tamiya Tezuka, a car dealer at To- 
kyo Nissan Auto Sales, "Japanese auto manufacturers and the 
dealers are very closely tied to each other in capital ownership, 
48. Kinsley, supra note 6, at 4. 
49. See OKIMOTO, supra note 7, at 140. 
50. See Rapoport, supra note 12, a t  76. "[Tlhe Japanese don't really believe in 
antitrust. Enforcement is lax. Everyday business practices . . . ignore the gospel 
according to the Sherman and Clayton [Alcts." Id. 
51. OKIMOTO, supra note 7, at  141. 
52. According to Richard Johnson, president of General Motors, Japan, "[wlhen 
the Japanese companies went to the United States, the whole dealer organization 
was opened up to them." I T S . ,  Japan to Form New Forum to Boost U.S. Car Sales 
in Japan, INT'L BUS. DAILY (BNA), July 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li- 
brary, BNAITD File [hereinafter Boost Car Sales]. Where the Japanese had an 
advantage coming into the U.S. market, the Americans have a disadvantage trying 
to penetrate the Japanese market. 
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and it's next to impossible to sell a car from a different compa- 
n ~ . " ~ '  
Another reason for high consumer costs is that many 
cheaper imports never reach the Japanese market. Through 
their exclusionary buying practices, keiretsu keep less expen- 
sive foreign parts and goods out of Japan." This is also true 
of goods produced in Japan by newer companies that are not 
part of a keiretsu. Without a buyer, these companies soon with- 
er and die. 
The final disadvantage of keiretsu is the international 
trade friction they create. According to Charles Dallara, U.S. 
Assistant Treasury Secretary for International Affairs, "the 
amount of foreign investment in Japan is only 10 percent of the 
level of foreign investments in the U.S. and less than one fifth 
of the level in most other industrialized c ~ u n t r i e s . " ~ ~  Predict- 
ably, this discrepancy creates friction with other countries and 
is largely due to the keiretsu system's exclusionary nature. 
IV. POSSIBLE APPROACHES 
A. Government Intervention 
The U.S. government can adopt two different strategies in 
regard to Japan's keiretsu system: attack i t  or imitate it. Either 
strategy will likely irritate the Japanese, if not tactfully done, 
and neither strategy guarantees success. The following, howev- 
er, are several possible alternatives the U.S. government might 
pursue within these two strategies. 
1. Attack on the keiretsu system 
The U.S. government could attack the keiretsu system in at 
least four ways: through antitrust laws, retail sales regulations, 
taxes, and corporate rules. Each of these approaches involves 
pressuring the Japanese government to adopt new laws or to 
enforce existing laws. 
First, antitrust laws could dismantle the keiretsu system. 
Japan's current antitrust laws were largely enacted by the 
occupation forces after the w a r 5 9 h e  purpose of these laws 
was to dismantle the zaibatsu, or huge industrial holding corn- 
53. Id. 
54. See MacNeillLehrer Newshour, supra note 9 .  
55. Loosen Structures, supra note 28. 
56. See Rapoport, supra note 12, at 76. 
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panies, which fueled the imperialistic war machine. Initially, 
these laws were successful. However, when the occupation 
forces left Japan, enforcement of the antitrust laws relaxed and 
the zaibatsu companies once again formed business affiliations 
in the more loosely structured keiretsu.57 To this day, the anti- 
trust laws remain on the books, but are generally unen- 
forceds8 because "the Japanese don't really believe in anti- 
trust."59 However, if the United States and European govern- 
ments band together and demand that Japan enforce its anti- 
trust laws, the keiretsu system as it now operates would need 
to reform.60 With the enforcement of the current laws alone, 
keiretsu companies would be forced to deal more openly and 
become more loosely affiliated. This is one of the approaches 
the United States took during the 1991 Structural Impediment 
Initiative (SII) talks.61 
A second way for the U.S. government to use antitrust 
laws to attack the keiretsu system would be to extend U.S. 
antitrust laws "to allow prosecution of U.S.-based subsidiaries 
of Japanese companies that engage in anti-competitive trade 
practices in their hone [U.S.] markets."62 Thus, without hav- 
ing to pressure the Japanese government, the United States 
could force change on the keiretsu system. Consider, for exam- 
ple, the Temeco Automotive incident. 
Temeco, an Illinois company, supplied exhaust systems 
and shock absorbers to Mazda's U.S.-based manufacturing 
plants. When Tokico Manufacturing, a member of the same 
keiretsu as Mazda, set up in Kentucky, Mazda's orders for the 
Tenneco-made shocks suddenly stopped.63 In such a case, the 
federal government could prosecute Mazda for antitrust vio- 
57. See Ins id  the Charmd Circle, supra note 5, a t  54. According to Michael 
Gerlach, a professor of business administration at the University of California a t  
Berkeley, "[tlelling [the Japanese] to dismantle the keiretsu is like telling Ameri- 
cans to rip up their credit cards. I t  is fundamental to the way business has been 
done in Japan." Rapoport, supra note 12, at 85 (italics added). This statement 
would have been even more true in early postwar Japan. 
58. See Linda Sieg, Foreigners Have Doubts About Japan's Antitrust Stance, 
REUTER BUS. REP., July 16, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT 
File. T h e  FTC has been called a 'toothless tiger,' unable to emerge from the shad- 
ow of the powerful Ministry of International Trade and Industry whose mission has 
been to nurture, not restrain, industry." Id. 
59. Rapoport, supra note 12, at 76. 
60. See Rowley, supra note 29, at  44. 
61. See Loosen Structures, supra note 28. 
62. Rapoport, supra note 12, at 84. 
63. Id. at 80. 
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lations in the United States, thus punishing the Japanese com- 
pany. Such a policy would put pressure on keiretsu companies 
to deal fairly and openly within the United States. I t  might 
also indirectly pressure the Japanese government to effect 
changes from within JapanB4 
Another means the United States could use to attack the 
keiretsu system is to pressure the Japanese government to 
establish stricter retail regulations. Currently, keiretsu manu- 
facturers have so much control over retail outlets that they are 
able to set any retail price at which their goods must be 
sold.65 Often the manufacturer prints the price on the package 
which is "often inflated by 30%."66 Manufacturers are thus 
able to sell at inflated profits by forcing the retailer to sell at a 
certain price or offering phony discounts without cutting their 
own margins. Abolition of this resale-price fixing would hurt 
keiretsu manufacturers by cutting into their profits. 
In retail sales the United States could also press for the 
termination of "sale-or-return" arrangements that commonly 
exist between Japanese manufacturers and retailers. These 
arrangements provide that if goods cannot be sold a t  a certain 
price the retailer must return them to the man~facturer.~' In  
other words, these arrangements prohibit retailers from using 
true clearance sales to move dead stock. This keeps prices arti- 
ficially high and profits healthy for keiretsu companies. 
A third means the United States could use to attack the 
keiretsu system would be to insist on corporate tax reforms in  
Japan. Under the existing system, keiretsu companies are "al- 
lowed to write off the exorbitant sums they spend on promoting 
group-wide harmony."68 Managers in Japanese companies 
spend Y 5 trillion ($35 billion) annually on entertai~ment.~' 
Elimination of tax breaks for corporate entertainment would do 
much to break up the power of the keiretsu groups. This, how- 
ever, is probably an unrealistic solution because "it is difEcult 
to imagine America's corporate leaders advocating a crackdown 
64. The federal government is currently investigating at least six such cases in 
the United States. See id. at 84. 
65. See Cheaper Shopping in Japan, ECONOMIST, Jan. 28, 1989, at 15. 
Matsushita has 27,000 wholesale and retail outlets, and Toshiba has 14,000. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Id. "In clothing, for instance, 30% of the goods in shops go back to the 
manufacturer unsold." Id. 
68. In,de the Charmed Circle, supra note 5, at 54. 
69. Id. 
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on executive wining-and-dining, even for the Japane~e."~' 
American companies enjoy this tax write-off luxury as much as 
the Japanese. 
The fourth possible method of attack available to the U.S. 
government is to press the Japanese government to enact strict 
corporate laws. Such laws could include a requirement that 
keiretsu companies "list shares in their annual accounts,'"' 
maintain a mandatory outside director on the board of cbrec- 
tors, "strengthen shareholder[] rights, and facilitate mergers 
and  acquisition^."^^ 
Robert Zielinski, a financial analyst at Jardine Fleming 
Securities, argues that the keiretsu "system could in theory be 
diluted by introducing some changes to the rules under which 
banks and other holders of keiretsu shares are required to list 
shares in their annual accounts."73 The theory behind such a 
rule is that by exposing the extensiveness of the keiretsu alli- 
ances, the system would suffer. However, the keiretsu system 
has become so entrenched that this alone would probably not 
be enough to dismantle or change the system.74 
At the May 1991 SII talks in Tokyo, the United States 
urged Japan to install outside directors on the boards of Japa- 
nese corporations to  "strengthen shareholders' rights, and [to] 
facilitate mergers and  acquisition^."'^ Outside directors often 
sit on the boards of American companies and are "deemed to 
prevent collusive deals among companies with interlocked 
 shareholder^."^^ A .  increase in shareholder rights would ide- 
ally loosen the corporate keiretsu cross-shareholder's 
stranglehold on the corporation, allowing the company more 
freedom in the market. Lastly, laws facilitating mergers and 
acquisitions would allow investors to buy companies that may 
be potentially more profitable outside the keiretsu. 
However, if the United States pushes for such changes in 
Japan, the Japanese will .surely require concessions from the 
70.  Id. 
71. Smith, supra note 13, at 54. Listing is already required, but strengthening 
of the requirement is necessary. 
72. Loosen Structures, supra note 28. 
73. Smith, supra note 13, at 54. 
74. Id. Zielinski believes "the durable keiretsu system has shown signs of 
strengthening over time, at least if the internal 'cohesion factor' is measured in 
terms of the percentages of interlocking shareholdings of the various group mem- 
bers." Id. 
75. Loosen Structures, supra note 28. 
76. Id. 
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Americans. At the SII talks, the Japanese pressured America 
to "reduce its federal budget, enhance private savings and 
'press for an international investment climate that would facili- 
tate U.S. efforts to maintain its traditional open and nondis- 
criminatory investment policy.' "17 The U.S. government must, 
therefore, decide if the keiretsu system is a structure it should 
attempt to change o r  rather one it should attempt to imitate. 
2. Imitation of the keiretsu system 
Lester Thurow, Dean of the Sloan School of Management 
a t  the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, is a proponent of 
the keiretsu system. He outlines several steps the U.S. govern- 
ment should take to imitate the keiretsu system and build 
American competitivene~s.~~ Unless the government takes 
such steps, Thurow argues, American companies will not be 
able to compete with their Japanese co~nterparts. '~ 
Thurow first asserts the government should "[llet groups of 
companies own substantial shares in one another and put exec- 
utives on one another's boards."80 Additionally, he contends 
the government should "let financial. institutions own control- 
ling shares of nonfinancial public c~mpanies."~' Currently, the 
largest shareholders of many American corporations are finan- 
cial institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds, and 
insurance companie~.~"Unle those in Japan, these financial 
institutions "usually do not put their executives on boards of 
directors, since this would give them inside information not 
available to small shareholders. America's largest owners main- 
77. Id. 
78. Lester Thurow, Let's Learn from the Japanese, FORTIJNE, Nov. 18, 1991, at  
183 [hereinafter Thurow, Let's Learn]. For a more detailed discussion, see LESTER 
THIJROw, HEAD TO HEAD: THE COMING ECONOMIC BATTLES AMONG EUROPE, JAPAN, 
AND AMERICA 280-90 (1992) [hereinafter THIJROW, HEAD TO HEAD]. 
79. T ~ ~ o w ,  HEAD TO HEAD, supra note 78, at  290. "In today's economic world 
economy, where American firms must match up against the business groups of . . . 
Japan, American firms need to be able to form the same strategic alliances, the 
same self-help societies, and the same joint strategies for conquering world mar- 
kets." Id. 
80. Thurow, Let's Learn, supm note 78, at  183. 
81. Id. 
82. TmJROW, HEAD TO HEAD, supra note 78, a t  282. "In the aggregate, financial 
institutions such as pension fimds, foundations, or mutual funds own 60 to 70 
percent of most publicly listed companies." Id. 
1168 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [I992 
tain an arm's-length relationship with the firms they collective- 
ly own."g3 
According to Thurow, this practice of arm's-length relations 
between companies prohibits large shareholders from being 
"active builders who seek to strengthen a company's long-run 
competitive position."84 Instead, these financial institutions 
become short-term speculators trying to succeed in the takeover 
wars. If "finance and industry. . . become so entwined that 
their destinies cannot be ~eparated,"'~ short-term speculation 
would cease and corporations could focus on long-term results 
rather than on quarterly dividends. 
Thurow argues that the current antitrust laws, passed in 
Congress's attempt to find "a scapegoat for the Great Depres- 
sion . . . should be r e m ~ v e d . " ~ ~ h i s  would allow the leaders of 
financial institutions to sit on boards of directors, in effect 
bindmg them to the corporation for the long haul. Financial 
institutions "should be encouraged to get into financial situa- 
tions from which they cannot extract themselves, except by 
making the corporations in which they have invested success- 
f~1.99~~ 
Thurow's second suggestion is to pass laws requiring that 
"those who own a dominant position in any company-say 20 
percent or more-should be forced to give the public one day's 
advance notice of their intention to sell any of the shares."8g 
These laws would prevent dominant shareholders with repre- 
sentation on boards of directors from abusing inside informa- 
tion. If a dominant shareholder attempts to jump ship, the 
day's notice requirement would give smaller, uninformed 
shareholders ample time to sell their shares, driving the price 
83. Thurow, Let's h a r n ,  supra note 78, at 183. 
84. Tmrrrow, HEAD TO HEAD, supra note 78, at 282. 
85. Id. at 287. 
86. Thurow, Let's b a r n ,  supra note 78, at 184. "[Ojne of the institutions that 
allowed America to build its economic supremacy in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries [was] the alliance of companies interlocked through financial institutions." 
Id. at  183. An example of this was the House of Morgan, centered around the 
merchant banker J. P. Morgan, with significant investments in a diverse group of 
industrial companies. Because such alliances were seen as the cause of the Depres- 
sion, the government passed antitrust laws to break them up. According to 
Thurow, many "[h]istorians now know that factors much more fundamental than 
Morgan's practice caused the Depression, but the rules prohibiting business groups 
have persisted." Id. at  184. 
87. TmrrroW, HEAD TO HEAD, supra note 78, at  287. 
88. Id. at 289. 
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down for the dominant ~hareholder.~' Conversely, if a domi- 
nant shareholder wanted t o  accumulate more shares, the notice 
would allow investors not privy to  the same information to buy 
at the current price. 
Thurow's third suggestion is to reinforce the distinction 
between traders and investors by making "voting rights in- 
crease with the length of time shares are held, with full rights 
attained after . . . five years."g0 This would encourage inves- 
tors, especially large institutional investors, to invest with an 
eye to the long term. While this would still allow the sharp- 
shooting stock trader t o  grow rich by buying and selling shares, 
it would deny him "owner" status with a right to  vote and 
make decisions." 
Last, Thurow recommends "assign[ing] voting rights to 
lenders who make long-term loans to a ~ompany."'~ This 
would largely erase the distinction between debt and equity, 
allowing institutions that provide long-term loans to companies 
active strategic direction in those companies. As lender-direc- 
tors, the banks' roles would be those of informed and active 
lenders, rather than of the "absentee landlord" positions they 
currently occ~py.'~ 
According to Thurow, these four changes in U.S. corporate 
law would create an American industrial environment capable 
of competing in the global market by putting "real capitalists 
back in the driver's seat of the American corporation. Then box 
them in so that they have no choice but t o  improve their firms 
and, hence the nation's productivity and competitiveness if they 
want to  be personally successful."94 Rather than force the rest 
of the world-especially Japan, whose history and culture is so 
different from the United States2-to follow our rules, America 
can succeed by banding together and learning to play the Japa- 
nese game like the Japanese. Thus, America may be better off 
by imitating the keiretsu system rather than attacking it. 
B. Business Solutions 
Until lawmakers change domestic laws t o  weaken the 
89. Id. 
90. Thurow, Let's barn, supra note 78, at 183. 
91. THUROW, HEAD TO HEAD, supra note 78, at 289. 
92. Thurow, Let's Learn, supra note 78, at 183. 
93. TH~JRQW, HEAD TO HEAD, supra note 78, at 290. 
94. Id. 
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keiretsu ties of Japanese companies within the United States, 
American companies need to compete by either imitating the 
keiretsu system or forming alliances with Japanese companies 
already in established keiretsu. Companies entering the Japa- 
nese market have found a t  least two noteworthy means to beat 
the keiretsu system: operating specialized stores and retailing 
through their own networks. These two techniques have proved 
successful for several companies operating in Japan. 
Over the last five years, specialized clothing stores in Ja- 
pan, while lowering prices, have managed to double their mar- 
ket share.g5 This is partly due to revisions in Japan's Large 
Scale Retail Store Law of 1974, which allow for 'large-scale" 
stores to open with fewer restrictions than before? Special- 
ized clothing stores in particular have succeeded by moving 
more clothes a t  lower costs than competing keiretsu retail dis- 
tributors. These specialized stores do this -by cutting handling 
costs, especially because unsold goods are not-returned to the 
wholesaler. By selling only a single line of goods, focusing on 
the weekend customer, and hiring more part-time employees 
than traditional keiretsu controlled retail stores, specialized 
stores have found a profitable niche in the Japanese marketeg7 
American companies wishing to succeed in Japan may find this 
a viable alternative to competing within the keiretsu dominated 
system. 
American companies can also compete in Japan by creating 
their own distribution networks. Amway and Tupperware have 
done this successfully in Japan much like they have in the 
United States. Both of these companies distribute and sell 
products largely through a home sales network. This works 
especially well in Japan where many women still have difficul- 
ty working outside the home. These women provide an excel- 
lent work force, distribution network, and customer base. 
"Eastman Kodak, which has sales of more than $1 billion a 
year in Japan, is putting together its own mini-keiretsu. Kodak 
has acquired a number of its distributors and has taken small 
95. Charles Smith, Wholesale Killers, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 17, 1991, at 45, 
45. "So-called 'roadside' stores in city suburbs, which buy directly from manufac- 
turers, now account for 10% of the Y3.6 trillion (US$26.5 billion) men's clothing 
market." Id. 
96. See Charles Smith, Reforms in Store, FAR E. ECON. REV., Jan. 17, 1991, at 
44, 44. "Large stores" are defmed as having more than 500 square meters of floor 
space. Id. 
97. See Smith, supra note 95, at 45. 
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stakes in some 50 suppliers and  customer^.'^^ Although this 
may not be a feasible way for all companies to enter the Japa- 
nese market, it is one way to compete successfully in the 
keiretsu dominated distribution system. 
With the increasing number of Japanese companies setting 
up shop in America, many companies with no interest in enter- 
ing the foreign arena are finding it necessary to compete with 
the keiretsu system.99 MIT's Charles Ferguson bluntly states: 
"When an opponent or a competitor is using a particularly 
strong and distasteful tactic, you may have to use i t  too."'00 
Examples of American companies joining together in 
keiretsu-fashion to become more competitive are the recent IBM 
joint ventureslo' involving Apple computers (once a key ri- 
val), S e i m e n ~ , ' ~ ~  Lang Labs,lo3 Sears,lo4 and Diebold.lo5 
Together, these companies are more capable of competing in 
the international market. In fact, Yoshi Tsurumi, a professor a t  
Baruch College in Tokyo, asserts that such alliances are long 
overdue and that "American companies will be doomed unless 
they really just start forming their own international as well as 
domestic alliances."lo6 For Americans like Lynn Williams, for- 
mer U.S. Trade Negotiator who feels the Japanese "have to 
play along with therest  of us,"'07 this is not very palatable 
alternative. lo' 
Although probably more difficult, another alternative is for 
American companies to try to become part of the Japanese 
98. Rapoport, supra note 12, at  85. Albert Sieg, former head of Kodak Japan 
said, "To the Japanese, the keiretsu is a very comfortable way of business." Id. 
99. A study by the University of Michigan suggests that as much as "90% of 
the parts in Japanese cars built in America come either direct from Japan or from 
Japanese manufacturers which have set up shop in the United States." Ins& the 
Charmed Circle, supra note 5, at  54. Even Honda, the most aggressive about using 
locally procured parts, only uses about one-third American-made parts. Boost Car 
Sales, supra note 52. 
100. MacNeil l k h r e r  Newshour, supra note 9. 
101. Id. 
102. Seimens is a German firm and the joint product is in the field of semicon- 
ductors. Id. 
103. The Lang Labs joint venture involves imaging. Id. 
104. The Sears venture involves personal computer software. Id. 
105. The Diebold venture is for automated teller machines. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. Williams insists, "Anyone who says that a Keiretsu system is good is 
looking a t  it from the standpoint of a taker, somebody who's benefiting from it. 
Those who are outside the system do not benefit from i t  at  all and can compete 
with it only in their Keiretsu system." Id. (italics added). 
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keiretsu web. This, however, has proven difficult as Japanese 
companies prefer to keep business to themselves. Even when 
inclined to let foreigners into their alliances, the Japanese are 
more apt to choose European companies over American part- 
ners. log 
Keiretsu present a serious challenge to American business. 
Because of their many benefits, the Japanese are not likely to 
abandon keiretsu unless the U.S. government applies serious 
pressure. However, this may not be in America's best interest. 
American government and business must develop an alterna- 
tive approach. Imitation of the keiretsu system, coupled with 
reforms in federal corporate law, may be the only workable 
choice for the United States. 
Jonathan E. Johnson 111 
109. See Inside the Charmed Circle, supra note 5 ,  at 54. 
